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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Penn Township ("Township") appeals the District Court's 
order directing it to allow APT Pittsburgh Limited 
Partnership ("APT") to erect a communications tower for its 
Personal Communications System ("PCS") at a designated 
site within the Township. The Township claims that the 
District Court erred in concluding that its zoning ordinance 
was impermissibly exclusionary under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. APT defends the District Court's conclusion 
on that score and cross-appeals the District Court's 
conclusion that the Township's zoning ordinance did not 
also violate the 1996 Telecommunications Act ("TCA"), 47 
U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) & (iii), and, as a result, 42 U.S.C. 
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S 1983 as well. We conclude that the Township's ordinance 
is not invalid under state law or the TCA and will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
APT holds a license from the Federal Communications 
Commission ("FCC") to provide wireless PCS services in the 
Pittsburgh Major Trading Area ("PMTA"), which includes 
Penn Township. APT's FCC license requires it to provide 
"seamless" coverage in the PMTA. PCS systems are 
arranged around service "cells" that are anchored upon a 
communications facility that transmits and receives signals 
from PCS users traveling within the cell. The cells are 
arranged in a "honeycomb" pattern, each bordering the 
next so that users are passed between facilities as they 
travel. Communications facilities are essentially antennae 
mounted upon existing structures, new communications 
towers, and even include smaller units placed upon 
telephone and power line poles. Transmissions between 
communications facilities and mobile users operate on a 
"line of sight basis." As a result, antennae height becomes 
a crucial factor in areas with hilly or mountainous terrain 
and other physical obstructions. 
 
APT's PMTA service honeycomb suffered from a gap in 
coverage along the major Route 8 corridor in the Township. 
As a result, APT decided to create a new cell by installing 
a new communications facility in the Township. Because 
the Township's topography is marked by rolling hills, APT 
decided to build a new communications tower to provide 
the height necessary to provide efficient service in the new 
cell. APT identified a suitable site at 130 Winters Road, 
which is owned by Chris Smith ("Smith Property"). The site 
was located on a 73 acre tract in a rural wooded area in the 
Township's residential RE zoning district ("RE District"). 
Soon thereafter, however, the Township passed Ordinance 
109 which amended the existing zoning regime to restrict 
communications towers to the Township's light industrial M 
Districts.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Ordinance 109 imposes conditions upon tower construction in the M 
District including requiring that all towers be: (1) "stealth" designed; 
(2) 
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To comply with the new Ordinance, APT conducted a 
three month investigation to find a suitable tower site in 
one of the Township's three M Districts. APT eventually 
concluded, however, that land in the M Districts was either 
not technologically feasible or unavailable. APT then 
decided to enter into a lease agreement for the Smith 
Property and applied to the Township's Zoning Hearing 
Board ("ZHB") for a zoning variance to except the Smith 
Property from Ordinance 109's prohibition upon 
communications towers in RE Districts. APT proposed to 
erect a 160È lattice tower that could accommodate six 
antennae and would not require FAA lighting. In the event 
that the ZHB concluded that a variance was not in order, 
the application asserted two additional alternative grounds 
for relief by claiming that the Township's zoning regime (i) 
was impermissibly exclusionary under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, and (ii) violated S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the TCA 
because it "had the effect of prohibiting" the provision of 
PCS services in the Township. APT contended that both 
alternative grounds entitled it to site specific relief 
permitting it to build its proposed tower on the Smith 
Property. 
 
The ZHB held a public hearing to consider APT's 
application. Normally, three ZHB officers preside over such 
hearings, but only two officers were available for APT's 
hearing. Nonetheless, APT and the Township consented to 
have their dispute resolved by a two-officer board. APT 
presented documentary exhibits and three witnesses in 
support of its application. A number of members of the 
public spoke in opposition to APT's proposal. 
 
The ZHB issued a written decision with findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that denied APT's requests. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
setback from neighboring property by the larger of (a) the tower's height, 
(b) the minimum setback mandated in the district or (c) 50 feet; (3) 
fenced and landscaped; and (4) no higher than 200 feet. Additionally, 
Ordinance 109 discourages lighting of the tower unless required by the 
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), and places the burden upon the 
wireless provider "to demonstrate, using technological evidence, that the 
antenna must go where it is proposed in order to satisfy its function in 
the company's grid system." (A34-8) 
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decision summarized the legal requirements for a variance 
and explained that APT had failed to satisfy those 
requirements. With respect to APT's two alternative 
challenges to Ordinance 109's validity, the decision stated 
that "by reason of a split decision by the [ZHB], with only 
two members participating, the challenges to the Ordinance 
are deemed denied." (A42) 
 
APT then filed this suit in the District Court to challenge 
the ZHB's decision. Treating the parties' submissions as 
cross-motions for summary judgment, and considering only 
the ZHB's record, the District Court agreed with APT that 
Ordinance 109 was impermissibly exclusionary, but denied 
APT's federal claims. It entered an order directing the 
Township to allow APT to build its tower on the Smith 
Property. Both parties appeal. 
 
II. 
 
Congress enacted the TCA to provide "a pro-competitive, 
de-regulatory national policy framework designed to rapidly 
accelerate private sector deployment of advanced 
telecommunications and information technologies and 
services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications 
markets to competition." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 1124. Section 
332(c)(7) of the TCA expressly preserves the traditional 
authority enjoyed by state and local government to regulate 
land use and zoning, but places several substantive and 
procedural limits upon that authority when it is exercised 
in relation to personal wireless service facilities: 
 
       (7) Preservation of local zoning authority 
 
       (A) General authority 
 
       Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in 
       this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a 
       State or local government or instrumentality thereof 
       over decisions regarding the placement, 
       construction, and modification of personal wireless 
       service facilities. 
 
       (B) Limitations 
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       (i) The regulation of the placement, construction, 
       and modification of personal wireless service 
       facilities by any State or local government or 
       instrumentality thereof-- 
 
         (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate am ong 
       providers of functionally equivalent services; and 
 
         (II) shall not prohibit or have the effect  of 
       prohibiting the provision of personal wireless 
       services. 
 
       (ii) A State or local government or instrumentalit y 
       thereof shall act on any request for authorization to 
       place, construct, or modify personal wireless 
       service facilities within a reasonable period of time 
       after the request is duly filed with such government 
       or instrumentality, taking into account the nature 
       and scope of such request. 
 
       (iii) Any decision by a State or local government 
       or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to 
       place, construct, or modify personal wireless 
       service facilities shall be in writing and supported 
       by substantial evidence contained in a written 
       record. 
 
       (iv) No State or local government or 
       instrumentality thereof may regulate the 
       placement, construction, and modification of 
       personal wireless service facilities on the basis of 
       the environmental effects of radio frequency 
       emissions to the extent that such facilities comply 
       with the Commission's regulations concerning such 
       emissions. 
 
       (v) Any person adversely affected by any final 
       action or failure to act by a State or local 
       government or any instrumentality thereof that is 
       inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within 30 
       days after such action or failure to act, commence 
       an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
       The court shall hear and decide such action on an 
       expedited basis. Any person adversely affected by 
       an act or failure to act by a State or local 
 
                                6 
  
       government or any instrumentality thereof that is 
       inconsistent with clause (iv) may petition the 
       Commission for relief. 
 
47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7). 
 
Two of the TCA's limitations on state and local regulation 
of land use are implicated in this appeal. The first is its ban 
on regulations that "prohibit or have the effect of 
prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services." 47 
U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). The second is the requirement 
that any denial of a request to place, construct, or modify 
personal wireless service facilities must "be in writing and 
supported by substantial evidence contained in a written 
record." Id. S 337(c)(7)(B)(iii). To enforce these and the TCA's 
other limitations on the exercise of state and local 
authority, the TCA provides parties like APT, who have been 
adversely affected by a decision affecting wireless service 
facilities, with a cause of action to challenge those decisions 
in any court of competent jurisdiction. See id. 
S 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 
 
In this case, APT presented the ZHB with a "request to 
. . . construct . . . [a] personal wireless service facilit[y]" that 
triggered the ZHB's duty to abide by the TCA's substantive 
and procedural limitations.2 APT does not claim before us 
that the ZHB improperly denied its application for a variance.3 
Nor does it dispute that the grant of its application would 
be inconsistent with the provisions of Ordinance 109. It 
does claim that Ordinance 109 violates the Pennsylvania 
constitution because it is impermissibly exclusionary and 
the TCA because it has the effect of prohibiting the 
provision of personal wire services. Additionally, APT insists 
that the ZHB's denial of permission to proceed on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There is no dispute that APT's proposed tower constitutes a "personal 
wireless service facility" under the TCA. See id. S 332(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
 
3. Under the relevant portion of the Pennsylvania statute, 53 P.S. 
S 10910.2, a variance was available only if the property had unique 
physical attributes that prevented it from being utilized in accordance 
with the restrictions of the zoning law. As the District Court noted, the 
Smith property had unique physical attributes, but those attributes 
concededly did not prevent it from being utilized in conformity with the 
applicable zoning law. 
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Smith property cannot stand, because its decision on the 
constitutional issue and its decision on "the effect of 
prohibiting" issue were not "in writing and supported by 
substantial evidence contained in a written record" as 
required by the TCA. We will address this procedural issue 
first. 
 
III. 
 
Subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which imposes the 
requirement that any denial "be in writing and supported 
by substantial evidence contained in a written record," 
obviously contemplates a written record compiled before the 
state or local decision-making authority, a writing 
evidencing that authority's decision, and judicial review of 
the decision by the traditional, deferential "substantial 
evidence" standard.4 It thus seems apparent that 
subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) is intended to provide procedural 
protections with respect to determinations of factual issues 
made by a state or local authority in the course of applying 
state and local zoning law -- i.e., issues like the ones 
resolved in the ZHB's opinion in this case.5 By contrast, it 
also seems apparent that subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) is not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is unclear at this point whether the requirement of a "decision . . 
. 
in writing" is satisfied by a writing that simply memorializes the 
ultimate 
conclusion or requires findings of fact supporting the denial. Compare 
AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (when Congress has intended to require a written decision 
with factual findings, it has expressly done so; it did not in 
S 322(7)(B)(iii)) with Smart SMR of N.Y, Inc. v. Zoning Commission of the 
Town of Stratford, 995 F. Supp. 52, 56 (D. Conn. 1998) (findings of fact 
required); Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria, 963 F. Supp. 732, 
743 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (same); Western PCS II v. Extraterritorial Zoning 
Auth., 957 F. Supp. 1230, 1236 (D.N.M. 1997) (same). We find it 
unnecessary to resolve in this case whether memorialization of the denial 
will suffice. 
 
5. As we have indicated, the ZHB issued a written decision memorializing 
its denial of APT's application. That decision included findings of fact, 
based on substantial evidence, that were inconsistent with APT's 
entitlement to a variance from the requirements of Ordinance 109. It 
also noted the uncontested facts indicating that permission for APT to 
proceed would be inconsistent with the requirements of Ordinance 109. 
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intended to apply to decisions that are not to be made 
solely on the basis of the factual record before the agency 
and that are not to be the subject of deferential substantial 
evidence review. 
 
We have recently held, for example, that the substantial 
evidence review contemplated by subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) 
is not applicable to the issue of whether a state's denial of 
an application to construct a personal wireless service 
facility "has the effect of prohibiting the provision of 
personal wireless services." See Cellular Telephone v. Ho-Ho- 
Kus, No. 98-6484, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 1999). That decision 
is to be made de novo by a reviewing court that will not 
necessarily be limited to the record compiled by the state or 
local authority. Based on Ho-Ho-Kus, we conclude that 
APT's procedural challenge to the ZHB's decision regarding 
"the effect of prohibiting" issue must be rejected. 
 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the 
decision on the validity of Ordinance 109 under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution. We simply do not believe that 
this was the kind of decision that Congress had in mind 
when it passed subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). A decision on the 
"exclusivity" of a zoning ordinance under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution is a legal issue that is not subject to 
deferential judicial review. See Borough of Edgewood v. 
Lamanti's Pizzeria, 556 A.2d 22 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1989). 
While such decisions may involve some consideration of 
legislative facts, the evidence to be considered is not limited 
to the facts of the particular applicant's case and is not 
necessarily limited to the record compiled by the local 
authority. 
 
We thus reject APT's procedural challenges and turn to 
its substantive arguments. 
 
IV. 
 
Pennsylvania law presumes that zoning ordinances are 
"valid and constitutional, [and] thus places a heavy burden 
on anyone challenging the ordinance to prove contrary." 
Benham v. Board of Supervisors of Middletown Twshp. , 349 
A.2d 484, 487 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); Ficco v. Board of 
Supervisors of Hempfield Twshp., 677 A.2d 897, 899 (Pa. 
 
                                9 
  
Commw. Ct. 1996). "This presumption can be overcome by 
proof that the ordinance totally excludes an otherwise 
legitimate use." Farrell v. Worcester Twshp. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 481 A.2d 986, 989 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); 
accord Ficco, 677 A.2d at 899; Overstreet v. Zoning Hearing 
Bd. of Schuylkill Twshp., 618 A.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1992). Exclusionary ordinances take two 
forms: de jure and de facto. De jure exclusion exists where 
"the ordinance, on its face, totally bans a legitimate use." 
Farrell, 481 A.2d at 989. De facto exclusion exists "where 
an ordinance permits a use on its face, but when applied 
acts to prohibit the use throughout the municipality." Id.; 
see Borough of Edgewood v. Lamanti's Pizzeria, 556 A.2d 
22, 24 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). "Exclusionary impact can 
invalidate an ordinance; exclusionary intent is not 
necessary." Overstreet, 618 A.2d at 1113. 
 
If a party rebuts the presumption of constitutionality by 
presenting sufficient evidence that an ordinance is 
exclusionary, the burden then shifts to the state to 
demonstrate that the zoning ordinance "b[ears] a 
substantial relationship to public health, safety and 
welfare." Lamanti's, 556 A.2d at 24; see Exton Quarries, Inc. 
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of W. Whiteland Twshp., 228 A.2d 
169, 179 (Pa. 1967)("[A] zoning ordinance which totally 
excludes a particular business from an entire municipality 
must bear a more substantial relationship to the public 
health, safety, morals and general welfare than an 
ordinance which merely confines that business to a certain 
area in the municipality."). 
 
Employing this analysis, the District Court determined 
that Ordinance 109 is de facto exclusionary because it 
effectively prohibits the construction of communications 
towers throughout the Township. According to the District 
Court: 
 
       The record contains undisputed evidence that the 
       majority of all M Districts are unsuitable for the 
       erection of communications towers. Specifically, APT 
       introduced testimony that the M Districts are [1] 
       restricted to low-lying areas; [2] are too far away from 
       Route 8 for transmission purposes; and [3] that they 
       abut a stream bed in a floodplain area, and thus could 
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       be unsound from a geotechnical standpoint. Given that 
       unique topographical and geographical features are 
       necessary for the erection of communication towers, 
       and that only limited areas in Penn Township 
       incorporate such characteristics, I find [Ordinance 109 
       exclusionary]. 
 
(A12-13). The Court observed that, while the record 
indicated that some portions of the M Districts were 
suitable for APT's needs, the owner of these lands, the 
Spang corporation, refused to lease them to APT. Relying 
upon Borough of Edgewood v. Lamanti's Pizzeria , 556 A.2d 
22 (1989), the Court concluded that the unavailability of 
suitable land rendered Ordinance 109 de facto exclusionary 
and, because the Township had offered no evidence to 
prove Ordinance 109's substantial relationship to public 
health, safety or general welfare, declared it 
unconstitutional. 
 
The Township claims that the District Court erred 
because the record indicates that APT failed to carry its 
"heavy burden" to rebut the presumption of Ordinance 
109's constitutionality by showing that it effectively 
excludes the construction of any communications towers 
throughout the Township. It observes that Ordinance 109 
provides ample amount of land--more than 600 acres--in 
the M Districts where such towers may be built and that 
APT's evidence before the ZHB established only that APT 
was unable to negotiate a lease for some of that land to 
build a tower necessary for APT's system. According to the 
Township, APT did not provide any record evidence that 
other wireless service providers could not lease property or 
had similar technological limitations and were therefore 
unable to erect functional towers anywhere in the 
Township. We agree. 
 
Ordinance 109 allows landowners to build 
communications towers on over 600 acres of land located in 
three M Districts: (i) the Eastern M District, (ii) the Central 
M District, and (iii) the Northwest M District. To succeed on 
its exclusionary zoning claim before the ZHB, APT had to 
prove that no telecommunications provider, including itself, 
could build a functional tower in any of the three M 
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Districts. While APT claims that its evidence did just that, 
our review of the record indicates that it did not. 
 
Virtually all of APT's evidence before the ZHB focused 
upon proving that it could not find land in the three M 
Districts to build a tower that would enable it to fill the gap 
in its service along Route 8. It is simply not true, as APT 
maintains, that the record contains evidence that all 
wireless providers' systems suffer from the same gap and 
are prevented from filling their gaps by Ordinance 109. 
Indeed, APT's counsel told the ZHB just the opposite. In 
response to a question regarding other providers' needs to 
locate towers in the Township, APT's counsel stated: 
 
       There are currently four carriers or additional carriers. 
       There are four who are currently operating and several 
       additional carriers who have been granted licenses for 
       the area. 
 
       One of the important things to remember is that 
       because each system is designed differently, the 
       systems don't have an identical pattern for each carrier 
       so that where as one system may require locating a 
       facility and when I say a facility I don't mean a new 
       tower, it could be antennas locating on a building such 
       as APT has in other areas. 
 
       All the systems are different. Each company does not 
       necessarily have to have a facility in each municipality. 
       Because of the system difference among the carriers, 
       where APT may have a facility Sprint doesn't. There 
       could possibly be a facility that AT&T needs but that 
       APT does not require. 
 
       * * * 
 
       But, again, simply because there are different carriers 
       who have licenses for the same areas, it does not mean 
       that each one will require a tower at the same spot. 
 
(SA97-98, 99) 
 
The fact that the design APT has chosen for its system 
enables it to erect the tower that it wishes to build only on 
a relatively small portion of the land in the M Districts does 
not make Ordinance 109 exclusionary. Pennsylvania's rule 
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against exclusionary zoning does not impose upon a 
township the duty to assure that all providers, regardless of 
the systems they have chosen to construct, will have a 
suitable site for a functioning tower within the township. To 
be exclusionary, the ordinance must effectively foreclose not 
only APT's use, but all use. Yet, APT provided no evidence 
to the ZHB that other providers could not use any of the 
600 acres of M District land to build a tower that would 
functionally meet their systems' needs. Without such 
evidence we cannot fault the ZHB for determining that APT 
had failed to meet its "heavy burden" to prove that 
Ordinance 109 was unconstitutionally exclusionary. 
 
Moreover, we do not believe that APT proved that the 
concededly feasible M zoned land was unavailable to it. 
APT's evidence was designed to establish that it had a gap 
on Route 8 and, due to topographical constraints, only 200 
acres of land in the Northwest M District provided the 
necessary height for APT to build a tower that would reach 
its system's gap. APT claimed that the Spang corporation 
owned all of this property and, due to Spang's refusal to 
lease land to APT, this land was unavailable. 
 
APT claims that this situation is identical to Lamanti's 
Pizzeria, 556 A.2d at 24. There, the challenged zoning 
ordinance provided that restaurants could not be located 
on tracts of land smaller than 30 acres, and the only parcel 
meeting this minimum size requirement in the municipality 
carried a sales price of $5 million. The Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court held that the ordinance was de facto 
exclusionary because, due to the prohibitive price of the 
only conforming tract, no land was available in the 
municipality on which to operate a restaurant. 
 
This case is materially different. This is not a case in 
which it has been demonstrated that locating the proposed 
use in the Township is not economically feasible. APT's 
evidence regarding the Spang property reveals only that an 
APT representative approached Spang regarding the 
availability of a lease and received a negative response. The 
record does not disclose anything else about the terms, if 
any, of APT's offer to lease or Spang's response. Nor is there 
any indication that APT made any effort to purchase the 
property. Without such evidence, one simply cannot know 
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if it is economically feasible to locate a tower on the Spang 
property.6 
 
In sum, the relevant inquiry here is not whether 
Ordinance 109 precludes APT from filling its service gap the 
way it would like at a price it would like to pay. The 
relevant issue is whether, despite the extensive amount of 
land where towers are permitted in the Township, 
Ordinance 109 effectively precludes any service provider 
from building a functional tower in the Township. APT's 
evidence before the ZHB is relevant only to the former. This 
record is remarkable not for what it contains, but for what 
it does not. Pennsylvania law imposed a substantial burden 
upon APT to rebut Ordinance 109's presumption of 
constitutionality. We conclude that the ZHB was entitled to 
find that APT had not carried its burden in this case. 
 
V. 
 
We next consider APT's claim that Ordinance 109 has 
"the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We also note that some record evidence indicates that 20 acres of 
feasible land not owned by Spang may have been available in the 
Northwest M District. Keith McCombs, a civil engineer, testified for APT 
regarding its search for appropriate land in the Township. His testimony 
on cross-examination included the following exchange: 
 
       Q. Ms. Stoker's testimony, as I remember it, was t hat there is 
       approximately 600 acres in the northwest M Zone and of that 
       approximately one third of it is suitable. So that give[s] us 200 
acres 
       more or less. As I understand it approximately 90 percent is Spang 
       property, so that would leave us 20 acres with other property 
       owners? 
 
       A. Yes, but 100 percent of the availability in the  M District is 
Spang. 
 
(SA 86) It is unclear from the record what McCombs meant by 100% of 
the available land is Spang owned, especially since his testimony is that 
the Spang property is unavailable because Spang would not lease it to 
APT. This statement contradicted his earlier statement on direct that all 
of the suitable property in the Northwest M District was owned by 
Spang. APT's expert testimony on this issue is ambiguous, and lends 
further support to the ZHB's conclusion that APT failed to carry its 
burden to establish that no land feasible for its use was available under 
Ordinance 109. 
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services" in violation of 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). As the 
Township stresses, every municipality's denial of an 
application to build a wireless service facility will have, to a 
degree, the "effect of prohibiting personal wireless service" 
because it will preclude the applicant provider from 
building a facility to serve its customers. Interpreting the 
TCA's "effect of prohibiting" clause to encompass every 
individual zoning denial simply because it has the effect of 
precluding a specific provider from providing wireless 
services, however, would give the TCA preemptive effect well 
beyond what Congress intended. See Town of Amherst v. 
Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 14 
(1st Cir. 1999) ("Obviously, an individual denial is not 
automatically a forbidden prohibition violating the "effects" 
provision."); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 
639 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim that individual denial 
violates "effects" provision because it would require court to 
"read the TCA to allow the goals of increased competition 
and rapid deployment of new technology to trump all other 
important considerations, including the preservation of the 
autonomy of states and municipalities."); AT&T Wireless 
PCS, Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 
1998) ("[A]ny reading of subsection(B)(i)(II) that allows the 
subsection to apply to individual decisions would effectively 
nullify local authority by mandating approval of all (or 
nearly all) applications . . ."); OmniPoint Communications, 
Inc. v. Scranton, 36 F. Supp.2d 222, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1999) 
(" `Were courts to hold that merely because there are some 
gaps in service in an area . . . the public interest 
necessarily tips the balance in favor of allowing a variance, 
local boards would be obliged to approve virtually every 
application.") (quoting Cellular Telephone Co. v. Borough of 
Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp.2d 359, 374-75 (D.N.J. 1998)); 
Primeco Personal Communications Ltd. Partnership, No. 97- 
208-CIV-OC-10B, 1998 WL 565036, at *12 (M.D. Fla. 1998) 
("S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) is intended to limit general bans or 
policies that prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the 
provision of wireless services. Any decision to the contrary 
would be at odds with the plain text of S 332(c)(7)(A), which 
expressly reserves the bulk of zoning authority to local 
governing bodies."); Virginia Metronet Inc. v. Board of 
Supervisors of James City Co., 984 F. Supp. 966, 971 (E.D. 
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Va. 1998) (accepting argument that S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) 
applies simply to individual denials "would be tantamount 
to the complete preemption of local authority in areas 
previously unserved by cellular services . . . [and would be] 
at odds with the plaint text of 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(A), 
which expressly reserves the bulk of zoning authority to 
local governing bodies."). 
 
We agree with these courts that the "effect of prohibiting" 
clause cannot be so construed. To do so would provide 
wireless service providers with a wildcard that would trump 
any adverse zoning decision that impaired their ability to 
provide wireless service, and would thereby create the 
proverbial "exception that swallowed the rule" that would 
be entirely inconsistent with S 332(c)(7)'s structure. Indeed, 
we do not understand APT to contend otherwise. 
 
This does not mean, however, that a provider can never 
establish that an individual adverse zoning decision has the 
"effect" of violating S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). Rather, it only means 
that the provider must bring additional proof to the court to 
demonstrate that the denial is representative of a broader 
policy or circumstance that precludes the provision of 
wireless service. The most thoughtful discussion we have 
found as to how this might be done is found in the recent 
opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Sprint 
Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 639 (2d Cir. 1999). 
After parsing the text of the TCA, the Court there described 
the focus of subsection 372(c)(7)(B)(i)(II)'s prohibition in the 
following terms: 
 
        By speaking in terms of communications between 
       land stations (cell sites that connect directly to land- 
       lines) and mobile stations (wireless telephones) and 
       access to facilities necessary to make and receive 
       phone calls, the plain focus of the statute is on 
       whether it is possible for a user in a given remote 
       location to reach a facility that can establish 
       connections to the national telephone network. In our 
       view, therefore, the most compelling reading of 
       subsection B(i)(II) is that local governments may not 
       regulate personal wireless service facilities in such a 
       way as to prohibit remote users from reaching such 
       facilities. In other words, local governments must allow 
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       service providers to fill gaps in the ability of wireless 
       telephones to have access to land-lines. 
 
Id. at 642-43. 
 
The Willoth Court went on to point out that reading the 
prohibition in this manner did not eviscerate the regulatory 
authority of zoning boards preserved in the TCA. Local 
boards may insist that service gaps be closed by the least 
intrusive means: 
 
        A local government may reject an application for 
       construction of a wireless service facility in an under- 
       served area without thereby prohibiting personal 
       wireless services if the service gap can be closed by less 
       intrusive means. See Town of Amherst, 173 F.3d 9, 
       1999 WL 174253, at *5 ("[I]ndividual denial is not 
       automatically a forbidden prohibition," but disallowing 
       "the only feasible plan . . . might amount to prohibiting 
       wireless service."). There are numerous ways to limit 
       the aesthetic impact of a cell cite. It may be possible to 
       select a less sensitive site, see Gearon & Co. v. Fulton 
       County, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 1998), to 
       reduce the tower height, see Town of Amherst, 173 
       F.3d 9, 1999 WL 174253, at *6, to use a preexisting 
       structure or to camouflage the tower and/or antennae, 
       see e.g., Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning 
       Comm'n of Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d, 178, 185, 186 
       (D. Conn. 1998) (describing antennae placed on water 
       tower, and permitting applicant to reconstruct church 
       steeple with six antennae placed inside); Smart SMT of 
       New York, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n of Stratford, 995 F. 
       Supp. 52, 59 (D. Conn. 1998) (describing an antenna 
       placed on a billboard and current applicant seeking to 
       conceal tower with seven evergreen trees). 
 
Id. at 643. 
 
The Court further pointed out that, since the focus is on 
the remote users' access to the national telephone network, 
the authority of the local board to deny applications is 
greater where the area which the provider applicant seeks 
to serve is already served by another provider: 
 
        Furthermore, once an area is sufficiently serviced by 
       a wireless service provider, the right to deny 
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       applications becomes broader: State and local 
       governments may deny subsequent applications 
       without thereby violating subsection B(i)(II). The right 
       to deny applications will still be tempered by 
       subsection B(i)(I), which prohibits unreasonable 
       discrimination. However, it is not unreasonably 
       discriminatory to deny a subsequent application for a 
       cell site that is substantially more intrusive than 
       existing cell sites by virtue of its structure, placement 
       or cumulative impact. 
 
Id. 
 
The ultimate holding of the Willoth Court was that the 
"Act's ban on prohibiting personal wireless services 
precludes denying an application for a facility that is the 
least intrusive means for closing a significant gap in a 
remote user's ability to reach a cell site that provides access 
to land-lines." Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643. 7 We conclude that 
this reading of subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) effects the best 
accommodation of the two primary goals of the TCA. It 
preserves the authority of state and local land use planners 
to the maximum extent consistent with assuring the access 
of remote users of personal wireless services to the national 
telephone network. 
 
Given this understanding of subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), 
it is unnecessary for a provider whose application has been 
denied to show an express ban or moratorium, a consistent 
pattern of denials, or evidence of express hostility to 
personal wireless facilities. On the other hand, it is 
necessary for the provider to show more than that it was 
denied an opportunity to fill a gap in its service system. In 
order to show a violation of subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) 
under Willoth, an unsuccessful provider applicant must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Court indicated that the term "significant gaps" embraces a de 
minimis principle. "Where the holes in coverage are very limited in 
number or size (such as the interiors of buildings in a sparsely 
populated rural area, or confined to a limited number of houses or spots 
as the area covered by buildings increases) the lack of coverage likely 
will 
be de minimis so that denying applications to constuct towers necessary 
to fill these holes will not amount to a prohibition of service." Willoth, 
176 F.3d at 643-44. 
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show two things. First, the provider must show that its 
facility will fill an existing significant gap in the ability of 
remote users to access the national telephone network. In 
this context, the relevant gap, if any, is a gap in the service 
available to remote users. Not all gaps in a particular 
provider's service will involve a gap in the service available 
to remote users. The provider's showing on this issue will 
thus have to include evidence that the area the new facility 
will serve is not already served by another provider.8 
 
Second, the provider applicant must also show that the 
manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap in 
service is the least intrusive on the values that the denial 
sought to serve. This will require a showing that a good 
faith effort has been made to identify and evaluate less 
intrusive alternatives, e.g., that the provider has considered 
less sensitive sites, alternative system designs, alternative 
tower designs, placement of antennae on existing 
structures, etc. 
 
We agree with the District Court that APT has not 
tendered evidence which would support a conclusion that 
the ZHB's denial had the effect of prohibiting the provision 
of personal wire services. As we have noted, APT has 
successfully established that the design it has chosen for 
its system enables it to erect the tower that it wishes to 
build only on a relatively small portion of the 600 available 
acres. APT's evidence, however, tells one nothing about 
whether the other providers were already servicing the 
Route 8 corridor and, if so, how that service was being 
provided. While the record shows that APT considered other 
sites and the feasibility of a tower of lesser height on the 
Smith site, it would not support an inference that APT's 
proposal was the least restrictive means of achieving a 
significant gap in service. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As the Willoth Court pointed out, even if the area to be served is 
already served by another provider, the TCA may invalidate the denial of 
a variance if it has the effect of unreasonably discriminating between 
providers. Securing relief under this provision of the statute will 
require 
a showing that the other provider is similarly situated, i.e., that the 
"structure, placement or cumulative impact" of the existing facilities 
makes them as or more intrusive than the proposed facility. 
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VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and remand with instructions to enter 
judgment for the Township. 
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